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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge.    
 Plaintiff Glenford Ragguette appeals from the order of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands granting the motion 
for summary judgment filed by Defendant Premier Wines and 
Spirits, Ltd.  In turn, Premier appeals from the order of the 
District Court granting Ragguette‘s motion for an extension 
of time to file a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).  We hold that the District Court 
abused its discretion by finding that Ragguette established 
―excusable neglect‖ under this rule.  We accordingly 
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determine that the motion for an extension of time to file a 
notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(5) was improvidently 
granted.  We will therefore dismiss Ragguette‘s appeal for 
lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 Ragguette alleged a number of employment 
discrimination and related claims against his former 
employer, Premier.  Throughout this litigation, Ragguette has 
been represented by attorneys from a firm currently known as 
Lee J. Rohn & Associates—and primarily by Lee J. Rohn, 
Esquire, herself. 
 
 In a January 5, 2010 order, the District Court granted 
Premier‘s summary judgment motion and entered judgment in 
favor of Premier and against Ragguette.  The District Court 
provided its reasons for this determination in an 
accompanying memorandum opinion entered on the same 
day. 
 
 Ragguette‘s counsel failed to file a notice of appeal 
within 30 days of the judgment or order pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A).  On January 13, 
2010, Premier filed a motion for attorneys‘ fees and costs 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, specifically asking 
for the award to be directed (jointly and severally) against 
Ragguette and his counsel.  Ragguette submitted an 
opposition to this fee motion on January 28, 2010.  In a 
February 8, 2010 order, the District Court scheduled a fee 
hearing for February 23, 2010.  But, on February 24, 2010, 
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the hearing was rescheduled for March 1, 2010.  Following 
this hearing, Premier filed a contested motion to amend its fee 
motion, requesting, among other things, a fee award directed 
against Rohn in her individual capacity.  The original motion 
and the motion to amend, however, were subsequently 
withdrawn by Premier. 
 
   On March 5, 2010, Ragguette filed a motion for 
issuance of an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 58(e), or, in the alternative, for an order granting 
an extension of time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).  With respect to 
the alternative form of relief, he argued, inter alia, that his 
attorney‘s failure to file a timely notice of appeal was caused 
by excusable neglect.  In short: 
 
 Because of trial preparation for several 
other cases, counsel failed to actually issue the 
computer task.  Specifically, counsel annotated 
the order as to appeal issues and provided it to 
the secretary on the case.  The procedure in the 
office is that a task should have been generated 
by counsel to file the notice of appeal at the 
same time.  The secretary scanned the order 
with the annotation in to the system on January 
11, 2010 (Exhibit 1) but because there was no 
task did not prepare the appeal.  Counsel was 
unaware that the notice of appeal had not been 
e-filed and did not discover the same until 
preparing for the hearing on the fee issue when 
she did not find a notice of appeal in the 
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computer file. 
 
 In this case, the failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal was due to excusable neglect, 
so as to warrant the granting of the motion for 
extension of time.  The objective record shows 
that lead counsel for Plaintiff ―annotated the 
Memorandum Opinion of the summary 
judgment ruling to be used to draft the notice of 
appeal to move to appeal on the grounds as 
noted in the annotated document, and on the 
ground of the rulings denying discovery.  See 
screen shot showing date the annotated 
judgment was scanned as of January 11, 2010 
(Exhibit 1).  Counsel had requested that the 
annotated motion be scanned into the appeals 
file.  See, Exhibit 1, the annotations on the 
Memorandum.  Counsel was in trial and in 
mediations and then off island as set forth 
herein. 
 
 It has now come to counsel‘s attention 
that all that was done was that the annotated 
Memorandum Opinion was scanned.  The fact 
that counsel was off-island, and the fact that in 
her absence, the notice would have been 
prepared and reviewed and filed by another 
staff attorney, Counsel reasonably thought that 
the task had been issued.  
   
(A343-A344 (error in original).)  A so-called ―screen shot‖ 
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(which listed a pdf file entitled ―Annotations-re-
Memorandum-Opinion-and-Thoughts-for-Appeal-
01/11/2010‖ and indicated that this document was last 
modified at 7:44 a.m. on January 11, 2010) was attached as 
Exhibit 1 to Ragguette‘s motion.  (Dist. Ct. Dkt. Entry #137-
1.)   
 
 Premier filed its opposition to this motion on March 
16, 2010, and Ragguette submitted a reply on April 1, 2010.  
He also submitted an affirmation from Rohn herself as well as 
an annotated copy of the District Court‘s January 5, 2010 
memorandum opinion (attached as Exhibit A).  Rohn 
provided the following explanation for why the notice of 
appeal had not been filed:  
 
2. As represented in the Motion for 
Issuance of An Order pursuant Pursunat-to-
FRCP 58(e)-or-in-the-Alternative-an-Order-
Granting-an-Extention-of-Time-to-File-a-
Notice-of-Appeal-03-05-2010  after annotating 
the court‘s ruling, I submitted to my legal 
assistant and new motions attorney the 
annotated ruling, with the intention that a notice 
of appeal should be filed on the grounds as 
annotated in the ruling.  See, Exhibit A, 
Annotated Ruling. 
 
3. I had a mental lapse and failed to realize 
I was working with my relatively new motion 
attorney and not my former associate and 
partner of over 11 years who would have 
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correctly interpreted my notes and 
automatically calendared and drafted a notice of 
appeal without the need of a specific task, 
instead of simply filing the annotated decision.  
I further intended to issue a task and reasonably 
thought I had done so.  It appears I either didn‘t 
send the task or didn‘t complete the procedure 
as no task was generated by the computer. 
 
4. That my intention was to appeal the 
ruling is manifest from the annotated decision. 
 
5. Given the press of matters requiring my 
attention, matters that are objectively verifiable, 
it is understandable and reasonable under the 
circumstances that this oversight occurred. 
 
6. I honestly believed that a notice of 
appeal was filed in accordance with my 
annotations on the decision. 
 
7. I did not mention the intent to appeal 
during the hearing regarding the motion for fees 
because I wanted to verify my records as to 
what occurred. 
  
(A355-A356 (errors in original).)  There were a number of 
handwritten comments and notations on the annotated 
memorandum opinion.  Most significantly, the following 
comment was written at the top of the first page:  ―*Scan in as 
‗thoughts Re appeal‘.‖  (A357.) 
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 The District Court denied Ragguette‘s motion on May 
14, 2010.  Ragguette filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2010 
(a notice of appeal was previously entered on the docket on 
May 17, 2010, but Ragguette was then directed to refile using 
the correct prompt).  On April 19, 2011, we upheld the 
District Court‘s denial of his request for an order under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(e) because Premier never 
filed the appropriate motion for fees and costs pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).  However, we 
vacated the District Court‘s denial of his request for relief 
under Rule 4(a)(5) and remanded ―the case to the District 
Court to analyze whether the neglect at issue in this case was 
excusable under the Pioneer standard.‖  Ragguette v. Premier 
Wines & Spirits, Ltd., 424 F. App‘x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(footnote omitted).  We explained that the Supreme Court‘s 
ruling in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick 
Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), 
established an equitable approach to the ―excusable neglect‖ 
determination.  While a court must still take into account all 
of the relevant circumstances, ―Pioneer provides four factors 
to consider when making this equitable determination:  (1) the 
danger of prejudice to the non-movant; (2) the length of the 
delay and the impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason 
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable 
control of the movant; and (4) whether the movant acted in 
good faith.‖  Ragguette, 424 F. App‘x at 156-57 (citing 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395).  We concluded that the District 
Court abused its discretion by disposing of the Rule 4(a)(5) 
motion ―‗without an opinion, without a reason, and more 
importantly, without reference to the Pioneer four-factor 
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balancing standard.‘‖  Id. at 157 (quoting In re Diet Drugs 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 154 (3d Cir. 2005))).  
  
 On May 16, 2011, Premier filed its supplemental 
opposition to the Rule 4(a)(5) motion.  Among other things, 
Premier referred to Ragguette‘s testimony at a recusal hearing 
held before the District Court on January 26, 2011.  It also 
submitted a letter to Ragguette from a legal assistant at the 
Rohn law firm named Enith Abraham, which was dated 
January 14, 2000 and stated that the enclosed documents were 
being returned to him for his records.  Most significantly, 
Premier attached as an exhibit a series of e-mails exchanged 
by Rohn and Glenda Cameron, Esquire (who was then 
working with the firm on a contract basis), which had been 
produced in connection with an unsuccessful recusal motion 
previously filed by Ragguette and other Rohn clients. 
 
 Rohn began the rather lengthy e-mail chain at 2:03 
p.m. on March 1, 2010: 
 
it appears that the order on summary judgment 
came in on January 5, 2010.  although I did an 
annotation of the order and instructed taht it be 
placed in the appeal file after the finling of the 
notice of appeal, the appeal was not filed.  i 
only learned about it to day when prepping for 
argument on the issue of whether defendant can 
be awarded fees and costs.  that hearing was 
today.  the motion had originally been brought 
under rule 68 re offer of judgment.  but at 
argument today the defendant stated it wanted 
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to add an argument under title vii that the 
complaint was frivolous and as such defendant 
should be awarded fees.  the judge then invited 
her to also make an argument that the fees 
should be against counsel and not plaintiff.  we 
argued the motion woould not be timely and 
opposed.  court granted her a week to amend 
her motion to add issues re why case was 
frivolous etc and why fees should be awarded 
under title vii.  can I use that pending motion to 
file the appeal of hte underlying order for sj to 
wait and file appeal until that motion is ruled 
on?  if not is there someway I can file the 
appeal out of time. 
    
(A406 (errors in original).)  The two attorneys then 
exchanged e-mails addressing, among other things, the 
different options that could be available to pursue an appeal, 
when any motion for relief should be filed and what should be 
included, legal research, and the drafting of the motion itself.  
Asked by Cameron to provide ―facts showing ‗good cause‘ 
for the failure to file the  notice of appeal,‖ Rohn explained 
that: 
 
I annotated the sj ruling and stated move to 
appeal along with rulings denying discovery.  
Please scan in appeal file.  Instead all that was 
done was it was scanned into appeal file.  I got a 
task response done.  I thought it meant both.  It 
only meant scanned.  Normally under old rules I 
would know if notice done because it would 
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have been signed and physically filed.  With 
new if I am not there it just gets e filed so I have 
no way of on hand monitoring.  I did not realize 
not filed til prepared for argument on atty fees 
motion 
       
(A396 (errors in original).)   
 
 On May 20, 2011, the District Court conducted a 
hearing on the Rule 4(a)(5) motion.  Ragguette was not 
present, but Rohn provided a detailed (if unsworn) account of 
what had happened. 
 
 Rohn told the District Court that her firm used a 
system of ―computer tasks‖ and ―paper tasks‖ for making and 
monitoring assignments.  The Outlook computer program‘s 
task system apparently allows Rohn to assign a particular task 
to a specific subordinate together with a deadline for 
performing the task itself.  If the subordinate does not 
complete the task within the time limit, ―that task comes back 
to you in red saying, this task has not been done.‖  (A451.)  
On the other hand, there is also ―the physical paper, and the 
conversation.‖  (Id.)  Rohn claimed that, although she 
believed that she had successfully generated both a computer 
task as well as a paper task, she actually only ever created a 
paper task. 
 
 Rohn further explained that the new attorney or 
appellate motions clerk assigned this task ultimately worked 
for the firm for less than a year (and, at the time at issue here, 
had not been with the firm for a very long time).  Rohn 
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confirmed that ―I don‘t get any ECF1 files at all, because I 
don‘t monitor those deadlines,‖ and that, instead, ―all the ECF 
filings in my office, even [those] directed to me internally 
through technology, go to the attorney who is actually in 
charge of monitoring those [cases].‖  (A440 (footnote 
added).)  Although a self-confessed ―control freak‖ who likes 
to review every document with her signature (A444), it is still 
possible that she would not review a particular motion, even 
though it has her ―computer signature on it,‖ if she was 
unavailable at the time that the document had to be filed 
(A441).  She denied taking the position that she missed the 
deadline in this case simply because there ―was just too much 
going on.‖  (A444.)  In contrast, she purportedly missed this 
deadline because she believed the notice of appeal had been 
filed given the fact that she ―instructed that it be filed‖ and 
―gave the document to the motions clerk to assign it and to do 
the notice of appeal,‖ which would then have gone out (after 
being reviewed by at least one attorney at her firm) as a non-
substantive but time-sensitive filing.   (A444-A445.)  In other 
words, Rohn‘s various activities at the time that the notice of 
appeal should have been filed established ―why the appeal, 
the notice of appeal to be signed would not have necessarily 
come to me‖ and why she ―wouldn‘t have notice that 
someone else didn‘t sign the notice of appeal.‖  (A445-A446.)  
Rohn further indicated that, after the entry of the summary 
judgment order, she consulted with her client about filing an 
                                                 
1
   The Case Management / Electronic Case Filing 
(CM/ECF) system is a computer case management system 
that allows courts to maintain electronic case files and 
attorneys to file (and serve) documents through the Internet. 
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appeal and that he was in agreement with this course of 
action.  She also claimed that it was not her experience that 
the Third Circuit sends out scheduling orders within 7 to 10 
days of the filing of a notice of appeal.  According to Rohn, 
this Court instead sends out a mediation order around 30 days 
after the notice of appeal‘s filing, and a transcript purchase 
order or anything else would have gone to Rohn‘s associate—
not Rohn.  In any case, she purportedly would have 
discovered the oversight when the appellate briefing 
schedules were not issued 45 or 60 days after the notice of 
appeal was supposed to be filed. 
 
 In the end, Rohn accepted ―responsibility that while I 
believed that I had followed my regular procedure of the 
office, which is a computer tasking system to follow 
deadlines, it appears that I inadvertently did not do so.‖  
(A451.)  She defended her firm‘s ―very involved expensive 
computer system to track documents,‖ and claimed that this 
case involved nothing more than unfortunate ―human error,‖ 
which is the kind of mistake that everybody makes.  (A452.) 
 
    On June 7, 2011, the District Court granted 
Ragguette‘s motion for an extension of time to file a notice of 
appeal under Rule 4(a)(5).  Applying the Pioneer factors, the 
District Court focused on the circumstances as they existed on 
the day the motion was actually filed.  It did so because any 
subsequent delay cannot be attributed to Ragguette and 
instead resulted from the judicial proceedings.  ―Ragguette 
offers his attorney‘s mistake in following-up instructions to 
her staff to file a notice of appeal as the excuse for missing 
the filing deadline.‖  Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 
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Ltd., Civil Action No. 2006-0173, 2011 WL 2359920, at *1 
(D.V.I. June 7, 2011).  According to the District Court, 
Ragguette had failed to articulate any specific reason for not 
filing a timely notice of appeal in his original motion and had 
instead merely cited to his attorney‘s busy schedule.  At the 
hearing, his attorney ―represented that she had made a 
mistake when she failed to complete an additional step in the 
computer process in her office,‖ which meant that ―her staff 
never received the instructions to perfect an appeal.‖  Id.  In 
turn, this attorney provided support for her representation 
―with a screen shot of the computer message.‖  Id.  The 
District Court also acknowledged that the ―timing of the Rule 
4 motion is consistent with the defendant‘s suspicion [that 
Ragguette never intended to take an appeal and that his 
attorney decided to file one in retaliation for Premier‘s fee 
proceeding],‖ but it then added that there was no evidence to 
confirm this suspicion.  Id.  Therefore, the District Court 
found that the failure to file the notice of appeal was caused 
by attorney ―inadvertence.‖  Id.  It then stated that: 
 
        The delay, measured at the time Ragguette 
filed his motion, was twenty-nine days, but 
within the time for filing the Rule 4 motion.  
His attorney stated that only when she was 
preparing for the hearing on the motion for 
attorney‘s fees did she realize that the appeal 
had not been taken.  She then sought advice on 
how to remediate her failure.  There is no 
indication that she purposefully waited until the 
penultimate day to file the motion.  Under the 
circumstances, the delay was not inordinate.  
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Nor was it in bad faith.  The defendant argues 
that it will be prejudiced by the passage of time 
because witnesses have become unavailable and 
memories are fading.  It also complains about 
the significant costs it has expended since the 
entry of judgment in its favor and will incur in 
the future.  The first concern regarding the 
witnesses is not compelling.  Ragguette seeks 
leave to appeal.  No witnesses are necessary on 
appeal.  The record is closed.  In the event 
Ragguette‘s appeal is denied, there will be no 
need for witnesses.  On the other hand, if he 
prevails, witnesses will be necessary at a trial.  
The defendant would face either situation had 
Ragguette filed a timely appeal.  Nor is there 
evidence that defendant has incurred any 
significant costs since the entry of judgment, or 
that it will incur significant future costs 
connected to this motion.  Again, at this point, 
any delay beyond the twenty-nine days was not 
Ragguette‘s fault.  Moreover, there is no 
demonstration of actual harm to the defendant 
as a result of the late filing. 
 
Id. at *1. 
 
 Pursuant to the District Court‘s order granting his Rule 
4(a)(5) motion, Ragguette filed, on June 8, 2011, a notice of 
appeal with respect to the order granting summary judgment.  
Premier likewise appealed from the District Court‘s Rule 
4(a)(5) order itself, which this Court has treated as a cross-
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appeal. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this 
employment case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  
As we explain in more detail in Section III, infra, we must 
dismiss Ragguette‘s appeal because of the absence of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
 
 It is uncontested that this Court generally reviews a 
district court‘s decision whether or not to grant an extension 
of time to file a notice of appeal for an abuse of discretion.  
See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 
153 (3d Cir. 2005).  The district court abuses its discretion if 
its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law, or the improper application of law to 
fact.  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 
188, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).  ―An abuse of discretion may also 
occur when ‗no reasonable person would adopt the district 
court‘s view.‘‖  Id. (quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 
F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)).  ―Finally, ‗we will not interfere 
with the [D]istrict [C]ourt‘s exercise of discretion ―unless 
there is a definite and firm conviction that the court . . . 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.‖‘‖  Id. 
(quoting same). 
 
III. 
 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) states that:  ―Except as otherwise 
provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, 
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order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil 
nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of 
appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such 
judgment, order or decree.‖  Pursuant to this statutory 
provision, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) 
provides that, ―[i]n a civil case, except as provided in Rules 
4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days 
after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.‖  The 
Supreme Court has determined that ―the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional 
requirement.‖  Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). 
 
 Ragguette was required to file a notice of appeal 
within the applicable 30-day time period following the 
January 5, 2010 entry of the order granting Premier‘s motion 
for summary judgment.  In other words, he had to file his 
notice of appeal on or before February 4, 2010.  He clearly 
failed to do so. 
 
However, the district courts do ―have limited authority 
to grant an extension of the 30-day time period.‖  Id. at 208.  
28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) provides that ―[t]he district court may, 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration 
of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time 
for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good 
cause.‖  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) 
authorizes a party to file such a ―Motion for Extension of 
Time.‖  This rule currently provides that: 
(A)  The district court may extend the time to 
file a notice of appeal if: 
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(i)  a party so moves no later than 30 
days after the time prescribed by this 
Rule 4(a) expires; and 
 
(ii)  regardless of whether its motion is 
filed before or during the 30 days after 
the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) 
expires, that party shows excusable 
neglect or good cause. 
 
(B)  A motion filed before the expiration of the 
time prescribed in Rule 4(a)(1) or (3) may be ex 
parte unless the court requires otherwise.  If the 
motion is filed after the expiration of the 
prescribed time, notice must be given to the 
other parties in accordance with local rules. 
 
(C)  No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may 
exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 
days after the date when the order granting the 
motion is entered, whichever is later. 
 
Ragguette filed his motion on Friday, March 5, 2010, which 
was 59 days after the entry of the order.  Because the 60th 
day was a Saturday, he actually had until the next business 
day, Monday, March 8, 2010, to file his Rule 4(a)(5) motion.  
See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C).  In any case, Ragguette 
thereby ―filed a timely motion for an order granting an 
extension of time to file a notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(5).‖  Ragguette, 424 F. App‘x at 155 (footnote 
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omitted).  Because this motion was filed in a timely fashion 
(and the ―good cause‖ component of the rule is not at issue 
here),
2
 the basic question now before us is whether or not the 
                                                 
2
  The good cause standard ―applies in situations in 
which there is no fault – excusable or otherwise.‖  Fed. R. 
App. 4 (Advisory Committee‘s Notes on 2002 Amendments).  
Courts, including our own, historically held that the ―good 
cause‖ language in Rule 4(a)(5) was inapplicable if the 
request for the extension was made after the period for filing 
a timely notice of appeal expired.  See, e.g., Consol. 
Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 827 F.2d 916, 918 n.3 
(3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that ―good cause‖ is basis for 
extending time to file appeal ―only if the request is made 
within the original 30 day period for taking the appeal‖ and 
that ―[a]ny request for extension filed after the original period 
has run is governed by the excusable neglect standard‖ 
(citations omitted)); Fed. R. App. P. 4 (Advisory Committee‘s 
Notes on 2002 Amendments) (describing ―misunderstanding‖ 
whereby ―most of the courts of appeals have held that the 
good cause standard applies only to motions brought prior to 
the expiration of the original deadline‖).  The rule was 
amended in 2002 to make clear that any that any such 
interpretation is mistaken and that ―good cause‖ and 
―excusable neglect‖ are separate bases upon which a Rule 
4(a)(5) extension can be granted regardless of when the 
requesting motion is made.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4 (Advisory 
Committee‘s Notes on 2002 Amendments) (―[A] motion for 
an extension filed during the 30 days following the expiration 
of the original deadline may be granted if the movant shows 
either excusable neglect or good cause.‖).   
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District Court abused its discretion by finding that Ragguette 
(and Rohn) established  ―excusable neglect‖ under Rule 
4(a)(5).  We must answer this question in the affirmative. 
 
   In our previous ruling in this case, we turned to the 
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment 
Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 
507 U.S. 380 (1993).  The Court considered the meaning of 
the term ―excusable neglect‖ in the specific context of a 
bankruptcy rule permitting a late filing of a proof of claim by 
a creditor if the failure to comply with the deadline (or ―bar 
date‖) was the result of excusable neglect.  Id. at 382-83.  
Most significantly, it emphasized that the whole notion of 
excusable neglect implicates an equitable inquiry and thereby 
went on to provide a number of factors to be taken into 
account in this analysis: 
 
 This leaves, of course, the Rule‘s 
requirement that the party‘s neglect of the bar 
date be ―excusable.‖  It is this requirement that 
we believe will deter creditors or other parties 
from freely ignoring court-ordered deadlines in 
the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve 
under Rule 9006(b)(1).  With regard to 
determining whether a party‘s neglect of a 
deadline is excusable, we are in substantial 
agreement with the factors identified by the 
Court of Appeals.  Because Congress has 
provided no other guideposts for determining 
what sorts of neglect will be considered 
―excusable,‖ we conclude that the determination 
 21 
is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of 
all relevant circumstances surrounding the 
party‘s omission.  These include, as the Court 
of Appeals found, the danger of prejudice to the 
debtor, the length of the delay and its potential 
impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for 
the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant, and whether 
the movant acted in good faith. 
 
Id. at 395 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).  ―Although 
inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing 
the rules do not usually constitute ‗excusable‘ neglect, it is 
clear that ‗excusable neglect‘ under [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 6(b) [allowing district courts to enlarge the period 
of time] is a somewhat ‗elastic concept,‘ and is not limited 
strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the 
control of the movant.‖  Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).  On 
the other hand, the neglect of both the party as well as the 
party‘s own attorney must be taken into account, and the 
Pioneer Court accordingly rejected the circuit court‘s 
suggestion that it would be improper to penalize a party for 
the omissions of counsel.  Id. at 396-97. 
 
The Supreme Court noted that the debtor did not 
challenge the bankruptcy court‘s findings concerning the 
creditors‘ good faith and the absence of any danger of 
prejudice to the debtor or of disruption to efficient judicial 
administration.  Id. at 397-98.  It further indicated that it was 
not inclined to unsettle factual findings entered by a 
bankruptcy court and upheld by both the district and circuit 
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courts on appeal.  Id.  In fact, the bankruptcy court observed 
that the debtor‘s reorganization plan had taken into account 
the late claims.  Id.  In the absence of any evidence of 
prejudice, disruption, or bad faith, ―the unusual form of notice 
[of the bar date] employed in this case requires a finding that 
the neglect of respondents‘ counsel was, under all the 
circumstances, ‗excusable.‘‖  Id. at 398-99.  The Pioneer 
Court also noted that counsel was still ―remiss in failing to 
apprehend the notice,‖ and it accorded ―little weight to the 
fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law 
practice at the time of the bar date‖ in assessing his 
―culpability.‖  Id. at 398. 
 
 We have applied Pioneer‘s equitable approach in a 
variety of circumstances, including proceedings under Rule 
4(a)(5).  See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 
F.3d 143, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, even prior to the 
Supreme Court‘s opinion, we addressed at some length the 
―excusable neglect‖ concept in the specific context of a 
motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal 
pursuant to Rule 4(a)(5). 
 
In Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Larson, 
827 F.2d 916 (1987), the Pennsylvania Attorney General‘s 
Office prepared a notice of appeal in a Middle District of 
Pennsylvania case on December 18, 1986, one day before the 
30-day limit for filing a notice of appeal expired.  Id. at 917.  
However, the notice of appeal incorrectly identified the 
district as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Id.  Instead of 
being hand delivered to the Middle District Clerk‘s Office in 
Harrisburg (which was actually adjacent to the Attorney 
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General‘s Office), it was mailed to the Eastern District 
Clerk‘s Office (which received the document on December 
22, 1986 and then forwarded it to the Middle District, where 
it arrived on December 24, 1986).  Id.  When notified by the 
Third Circuit Clerk‘s Office of a possible procedural defect, 
counsel immediately applied for a 5-day extension of time.  
Id. at 917-18.  The district court denied this motion, but we 
concluded that ―the district court erred as a matter of law in 
its rigid application of 4(a)(5).‖  Id. at 918. 
 
Rejecting the district court‘s attempt to establish a per 
se standard, we emphasized that the rule ―requires a case-by-
case analysis‖ as well as specific findings by the district court 
regarding ―the reasons underlying counsel‘s inadvertence.‖  
Id. at 919.  Noting the existence of ―a qualitative distinction 
between inadvertence which occurs despite counsel‘s 
affirmative efforts to comply and inadvertence which results 
from counsel‘s lack of diligence,‖ we went on to provide a 
non-exclusive list of factors to guide the district court‘s 
exercise of discretion: 
 
 Although every case must be examined 
on an ad hoc basis and it is impossible to 
compose an exhaustive list of factors relevant to 
a determination of whether excusable neglect 
has occurred, a thoughtful analysis of this issue 
in a particular context will, at a minimum, 
require a weighing and balancing of the 
following factors:  (1) whether the inadvertence 
reflects professional incompetence such as 
ignorance of the rules of procedure, Campbell 
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v. Bowlin, 724 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1984) (failure 
to read rules of procedure not excusable); (2) 
whether the asserted inadvertence reflects an 
easily manufactured excuse incapable of 
verification by the court, Airline Pilots v. 
Executive Airlines, Inc., 569 F.2d 1174 (1st Cir. 
1978) (mistake in diarying counsel‘s calendar 
not excusable); (3) whether the tardiness results 
from counsel‘s failure to provide for a readily 
foreseeable consequence, United States v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 508 F.Supp. 187 
(E.D. Va. 1981) (failure to arrange coverage 
during attorney‘s vacation which encompassed 
end of appeal period not excusable); (4) 
whether the inadvertence reflects a complete 
lack of diligence, Reinsurance Co. of America, 
Inc. v. Administratia, 808 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 
1987); or (5) whether the court is satisfied that 
the inadvertence resulted despite counsel‘s 
substantial good faith efforts toward 
compliance. 
    
Id. at 919. 
 
 We then determined, inter alia, that:  (1) the attorney‘s 
mistake was not the result of professional incompetence; (2) 
he was not attempting to create some sort of facile excuse to 
extend the time to appeal and, on the contrary, gained nothing 
from his error; (3) this type of human error, though avoidable, 
was not readily foreseeable; and (4) the attorney otherwise 
acted with due (if not perfect) diligence and in good faith in 
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attempting to comply with Rule 4(a)(5) (including, among 
other things, drafting the notice of appeal within the 30-day 
limit, serving the notice of appeal on opposing counsel in a 
timely fashion, and then expeditiously filing a motion for an 
extension of time).  Id. at 919-20.  ―This court interprets Rule 
4(a)(5) to require a finding of excusable neglect in those 
instances where the court, after weighing the relevant 
considerations is satisfied that counsel has exhibited 
substantial diligence, professional competence and has acted 
in good faith to conform his or her conduct in accordance 
with the rule, but as a result of some minor neglect, 
compliance was not achieved.‖  Id. at 920.  While 
emphasizing that the mistake there could have been detected 
by careful proofreading, we believed that even the most 
diligent attorneys are subject to these kinds of common 
human errors and, in particular, do not need to be reminded to 
address their mail accurately or to caption their cases 
properly.  Id.  Even though the district court‘s approach might 
have effectively deterred incompetence or callous disregard 
for the rules in some circumstances, it would serve ―little 
deterrent purpose‖ in the context of human errors that are 
―not readily capable of regulatory control.‖  Id.  We further 
noted that, ―[w]here as here the delay was minimal, and 
where the court has determined that the delay was not the 
result of any bad faith but rather occurred despite counsel‘s 
substantially diligent efforts at compliance, the judicial 
interest in deciding cases on the merits outweighs the interests 
in finality.‖  Id.  However, we also acknowledged that our 
opinion ―does not require the absolution of any and all 
clerical errors committed by counsel as excusable neglect,‖ 
and we were confident that ―[t]he threshold requirement of 
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establishing substantial good faith efforts to comply readily 
eliminates the most common errors from the excusable 
neglect analysis.‖  Id. at 921.  Declining to hold that the 
failure to proofread a caption must be deemed to be 
inexcusable in each and every case, we held that such a 
failure was excusable given the factual context presented.  Id. 
 
 We agree with Premier that the factors identified in 
Consolidated should still be considered in applying the 
overall approach subsequently set forth by the Supreme Court 
in Pioneer.  In fact, we actually cited our Consolidated 
opinion with approval in our prior ruling in this case vacating 
the District Court‘s order and remanding for further 
proceedings.  See Ragguette, 424 F. App‘x at 156.  
Furthermore, our reasoning in Consolidated essentially 
anticipated the approach taken by the Supreme Court itself, 
and we note that the Pioneer Court even acknowledged our 
Consolidated opinion as an example of a circuit court 
adopting ―a more flexible approach,‖ Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 387 
n.3.  It therefore is not surprising that we have continued to 
cite to—and quote with approval from—Consolidated as well 
as our subsequent decision in Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 
841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir. 1988) (turning, in service of 
process context, to five express factors identified in 
Consolidated as well as sixth factor for ―whether the 
enlargement of time will prejudice the opposing party‖).  For 
instance, we indicated that ―[t]hese six factors, announced in 
Dominic before Pioneer was decided, present a more specific 
application of the general considerations later announced by 
the Supreme Court in Pioneer.‖  In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2001).  In 
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other words, ―the Dominic factors that were not restated in 
Pioneer were instead subsumed in the more general 
consideration of ‗reason for the delay.‘‖  Id. (quoting In re 
Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 233 F.3d 188, 196 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2000)); see also, e.g., Cendant, 233 F.3d at 197 n.8 
(―Additionally, the District Court mentioned the three factors 
we identified in a case predating Pioneer, Dominic v. Hess 
Oil V.I., 841 F.2d at 517 (inadvertence reflecting professional 
incompetence, excuse incapable of verification, complete lack 
of diligence), though these are arguably integrated within the 
fourth Pioneer factor, ‗reason for the delay.‘‖).   
 
 Ragguette, however, contends that, because Premier 
had argued in the prior appeal in this case that the evidence 
was legally insufficient to show excusable neglect, this Court 
necessarily determined in its prior ruling that this evidence 
was sufficient for the District Court to rule in his favor.  
Simply put, Ragguette is reading too much into our prior 
ruling.  We merely vacated the District Court‘s denial and 
remanded for further proceedings because ―the District Court 
disposed of Ragguette‘s motion ‗without an opinion, without 
a reason, and more importantly, without reference to the 
Pioneer four-factor balancing standard.‖  Ragguette, 424 F. 
App‘x at 157 (quoting Diet Drugs, 401 F.3d at 154).  It is 
now our task to ascertain whether the District Court 
appropriately exercised its discretion by finding that ―the 
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neglect at issue in this case was excusable under the Pioneer 
standard.‖3  Id. (footnote omitted).   
                                                 
3
 We further note that Premier argues at some length 
that neither Rohn nor her client ever really intended to pursue 
an appeal, at least before the 30-day period to file a notice of 
appeal had already expired.  In fact, it vigorously attacks 
Rohn‘s own motivations, suggesting, for instance, that 
―counsel for Ragguette appeared more concerned with 
avoiding fees and costs being assessed against her.‖  
(Premier‘s Brief at 26.)  Based, among other things, on the 
screen shot, the annotated memorandum opinion, and the 
subsequent e-mail exchange between Rohn and Cameron, it 
appears that a prior intention to pursue an appeal did exist in 
this case.  We recognize that that ―the timing of the Rule 4 
motion is consistent with the defendant‘s suspicion.‖  
Ragguette, 2011 WL 2359920, at *1.  Likewise, Rohn‘s 
return of documents to Ragguette is suspicious given that 
such documents would be useful for the appeal that she 
professed she intended to file.  Nevertheless, we believe that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 
there was ―no evidence to confirm‖ Premier‘s suspicion that 
Rohn was acting in a retaliatory manner.  Id. 
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 Premier also argues ―that the absence of a 
notice of appeal within 60 days is a factor in the Pioneer test 
as it pertains to the length of the delay, the reason for the 
delay and whether counsel acted in good faith and the 
prejudice to Premier for the delay.‖  (Premier‘s Brief at 26.)  
For instance, Premier asserts that the delay at issue here ―was 
from January 5, 2010 to June 8, 2011.‖  (Id. at 30.)  While 
these kinds of considerations do not appear to be totally 
irrelevant to the Pioneer inquiry, we note that Premier itself 
acknowledges that this Court ―has already ruled that for the 
purpose of the motion for extension of time a notice of appeal 
is not required within the 60 days.‖  (Id. at 26.)  Observing 
that any subsequent delay was largely caused by the judicial 
proceeding itself, the District Court appropriately focused on 
―the circumstances as they existed on March 2, 2010, when 
the plaintiff filed his Rule 4(a)(5) motion.‖  Ragguette, 2011 
WL 2359920, at *1. 
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 We begin, like the District Court, with the ―reason for 
the delay‖ factor.  We agree with Premier that the District 
Court abused its discretion in its evaluation of this particular 
factor.  We accordingly must reject Ragguette‘s theory that 
there was a reasonable explanation for the delay and that this 
delay resulted from various circumstances beyond the control 
of his counsel.  Simply put, it cannot be said that Ragguette‘s 
attorney ―has exhibited substantial diligence, [and] 
professional competence, . . . but as the result of some minor 
neglect, compliance was not achieved.‖  Consolidated, 827 
F.2d at 920.  In addition, Ragguette‘s counsel clearly ―fail[ed] 
to provide for . . .  readily foreseeable consequence[s].‖  Id. at 
919 (citations omitted).   
                                                                                                             
 Because we ultimately conclude that the District 
Court abused its discretion by finding that Ragguette 
established excusable neglect, we need not—and do not 
reach—the various evidentiary challenges raised by Premier 
in its appeal (i.e., challenging the unsworn statements made 
by Rohn in the motion papers as well as at the hearing itself).  
On the other hand, we do reject Ragguette‘s theory that the 
Rohn-Cameron e-mail chain was covered by the attorney-
client privilege, protected by the attorney work product 
doctrine, and had been obtained pursuant to an improper 
order issued by the District Court in conjunction with a 
consolidated recusal motion.  We note that, among other 
things, Ragguette did not object to the submission of these 
documents to the District Court in connection with his Rule 
4(a)(5) motion, and, on the contrary, Rohn actually relied on 
this documentation at the Rule 4(a)(5) hearing.   
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Initially, the District Court found that the failure to file 
the notice of appeal was caused by attorney inadvertence—
specifically Rohn‘s own failure ―to complete an additional 
step in the computer process in her office,‖ which meant that 
―her staff never received the instructions to perfect an 
appeal.‖  Ragguette, 2011 WL 2359920, at *1.  We add that it 
appears highly doubtful that the firm‘s relatively new motions 
or appellate attorney would have understood that she was to 
have prepared and filed a notice of appeal based on the 
following cursory comment on the annotated memorandum 
opinion:  ―*Scan in as ‗thoughts Re appeal‘.‖  (A357.)  In 
fact, the associate apparently did exactly what the comment 
told her to do—she had the document scanned.  It is also 
unclear when exactly Cameron left the firm and how long her 
replacement had been working there by the time the notice of 
appeal had to be filed.  In any case, we believe that a 
reasonably competent attorney would have exercised more 
supervision and control over a purportedly new and 
inexperienced subordinate.  Rohn, at the very least, should 
have done more than make a number of vague annotations on 
the district court‘s ruling and should have anticipated that a 
relatively new employee would need more direction.  We also 
are troubled by the fact that Rohn essentially and rather 
conveniently sought to shift at least some of the blame from 
herself to another person (who actually was no longer with 
the firm by the time of the Rule 4(a)(5) hearing, did not 
submit any declaration in support of the motion, and did not 
appear at the hearing itself). 
 
Rohn likewise acknowledged that she personally failed 
to create the requisite ―computer task‖ as per her firm‘s usual 
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practices.  She thereby clearly carried at least partial 
responsibility for the breakdown in her firm‘s internal 
procedures.  In fact, the failure to create the critical computer 
task meant that this system was never really triggered in the 
first place. 
 
We add that the firm‘s own procedures had some 
serious deficiencies of their own.  As noted above, the proper 
completion of a computer task was evidently necessary to 
trigger this computer tracking system in the first place.  
Turning to the more significant matter of the ECF system, we 
do acknowledge that attorneys, especially well-established 
lawyers like Rohn, could have difficulties adjusting to this 
mechanism of electronic case filing (as well as other 
computer procedures).   However, it is also undisputed that 
Rohn herself had previously registered as an ECF user 
sometime before the beginning of 2010.  Rohn (or at least 
someone in her office using her ECF account) has actually 
filed numerous documents in this heavily litigated case via 
the ECF system since September 2007.  If a notice of appeal 
had actually been filed (as Rohn evidently believed it had 
been), a notice of such a filing would have immediately been 
sent via e-mail to any and all attorneys who had previously 
entered an appearance in the District Court proceeding.  
Accordingly, Rohn should have known that no notice of 
appeal had been filed because neither Rohn nor any other 
attorneys from her firm who had entered an appearance in this 
case ever received any notice of such a filing.  Having not 
received such a notice, any reasonably competent attorney 
would have looked into whether a notice of appeal had been 
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properly filed—especially where such a critical task had been 
assigned to a relatively new subordinate. 
 
At the Rule 4(a)(5) hearing, Rohn actually 
acknowledged that ―all the ECF filings in my office, even 
directed to me internally through technology, go to the 
attorney who is actually in charge of monitoring those,‖ and 
that Rohn herself ―wouldn‘t have gotten an ECF back.‖  
(A440.)  At the very least, we believe that such an 
arrangement was highly problematic.   In particular, a 
reasonably competent attorney who did not personally receive 
or otherwise look at ECF notices would have to set up some 
sort of additional method of keeping track of filings, 
especially those filings submitted under her own ECF account 
as well as critical filings like a notice of appeal.  Such an 
attorney would at least attempt to make sure that a notice of 
appeal had been filed within the applicable 30-day period by, 
for example, simply asking the subordinate whether—and 
when—she had filed this critical document. 
 
In fact, we previously turned to the ECF filing system 
as a basis for rejecting a claim of excusable neglect.  In Nara 
v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007), we concluded that ―the 
Commonwealth‘s overall negligence in handling the [28 
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas] matter precludes us from finding 
‗excusable neglect‘‖ under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) with respect to the Commonwealth‘s failure to file 
timely objections to the magistrate judge‘s report and 
recommendation, id. at 194.  We noted, among other things, 
that:  ―[A]ttorneys practicing in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania were under a standing order to register with the 
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Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system 
by July 1, 2005.  If the Commonwealth‘s attorneys had 
complied with that order, they would have received 
immediate electronic notification that the Magistrate Judge 
had issued the R & R and could have accessed it by hyper-
link.‖  Id. (footnotes omitted).  In turn, ―[t]he 
Commonwealth‘s Attorneys based in Harrisburg were 
required to register in the Middle District of Pennsylvania in 
2003.‖  Id. at 194 n.12 (citation omitted).  Because of the lack 
of excusable neglect, we proceeded to apply a plain error 
standard of review.  Id. at 193-97. 
 
It is well established that a busy caseload generally 
does not constitute a basis for a finding of excusable neglect.  
See, e.g., Pedereaux v. Doe, 767 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(―That counsel spent much of the latter period preparing for 
the trial of other matters does not excuse the failure to attend 
to the insubstantial task of filing a notice of appeal.‖).  
Ragguette accordingly denies ever advancing such a theory in 
the first place.  But he also continues to highlight his 
counsel‘s busy schedule during the relevant time period.  For 
example, Rohn raised the issue of her own caseload at the 
hearing, purportedly in order to provide an explanation as to 
why she would not necessarily have seen a notice of appeal 
before its filing and why she would not have known that no 
such notice had been prepared and filed.  We believe that 
Ragguette‘s attorney thereby attempted to draw too fine of a 
distinction.  Simply put, the busy caseload was essentially 
offered as an ―excuse‖ for ―the failure to attend to the 
insubstantial task of filing a notice of appeal.‖  Id.  We also 
believe that a reasonably competent attorney would have 
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better managed her own caseload and would have done more 
to make sure that the critical task of properly filing a notice of 
appeal was completed despite how busy she may have been at 
the time. 
 
 We likewise determine that Rohn clearly failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering the fact that no 
notice of appeal had been filed and then bringing this mistake 
to the attention of the opposing party and the District Court.  
This Court previously rejected the ―contention that Rule 
4(a)(5) provides an absolute 30 day grace period‖ and held 
that ―‗excusable neglect‘ must be shown up to the actual time 
the motion to extend is filed.‖  Id. at 51.  ―It simply is not 
overly burdensome to require a putative appellant, who has 
already missed the 30 day . . . mandatory appeal date of Rule 
4(a)(1) because of ‗excusable neglect,‘ to file immediately a 
Rule 4(a)(5) motion to extend when the excuse no longer 
exists.‖  Id. at 52.  In this case, a reasonably diligent attorney 
certainly could have—and should have—discovered the fact 
that no notice of appeal had been filed (or at least taken steps 
to investigate the matter) when:  (1) Premier filed its original 
fee motion on January 13, 2010; (2) Ragguette‘s opposition to 
this fee motion was filed (via the ECF system under Rohn‘s 
own account) on January 28, 2010; (3) the District Court 
entered an order on February 8, 2010 scheduling a hearing on 
the fee motion for February 23, 2010; (4) on February 24, 
2010, the District Court rescheduled the fee hearing for 
March 1, 2010; (5) no ECF notice was ever received 
indicating the filing of a notice of appeal; (6) no ECF notices 
were ever received with respect to a number of documents 
sent out by the District Court‘s Clerk (a receipt for payment 
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of the requisite filing fee for an appeal) as well as the Third 
Circuit‘s Clerk (the initial case opening letter and the 
assignment of the case caption) immediately after the filing of 
a notice of appeal; and (7) similarly, no ECF notices (or hard 
copies of the documents themselves) were ever received 
indicating that the parties filed various documents due shortly 
after the commencement of an appeal (i.e., entry of 
appearance, disclosure statement, civil appeal information 
statement, concise summary of the case, and transcript 
purchase order).
4
  Yet Rohn purportedly did not discover that 
                                                 
4
  In passing, Ragguette contends that there was no 
evidence in the record to support Premier‘s representations 
that Rohn should have received ECF notices for various 
filings and that, in fact, the record actually established the 
contrary.  We, however, must reject his assertions given the 
well-established nature of the procedures at issue here.  For 
instance, we observe that the docket sheet for Ragguette‘s 
successful appeal from the District Court‘s initial denial of his 
Rule 4(a)(5) motion indicated that the following documents 
were filed (and served) shortly after the May 20, 2010 filing 
of his notice of appeal via Rohn‘s ECF account: (1) on May 
21, 2010, the receipt for payment of the appellate filing fee; 
(2) on May 26, 2010, the initial case opening letter, the 
assignment of the case caption, and an order advising the 
parties of the Court‘s practice of holding Virgin Islands 
sittings twice a year as well as tentatively listing this case for 
May 2011; (3) on May 28, 2010, an entry of appearance from 
Premier‘s counsel and Premier‘s disclosure statement; (4) on 
June 11, 2010, a follow-up letter from the Third Circuit 
Clerk‘s Office to Rohn requesting the submission of an entry 
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no notice of appeal had been filed until her preparation for the 
March 1, 2010 fee hearing—approximately a month after the 
deadline for filing a notice of appeal and approximately two 
months after the District Court‘s summary judgment order.  
Nevertheless, she still did not even mention the mistake or the 
possibility of an appeal at the hearing conducted on March 1, 
2010.  Even though she claimed that that she did do so 
because she wanted to obtain verification, we must reject 
such an excuse given her prior—and extensive—lack of due 
diligence.  We also note that a reasonably competent 
attorney—having just discovered that a notice of appeal had 
not been filed almost a month after the deadline had already 
expired and immediately before a previously scheduled 
hearing—would have exercised more diligence in obtaining 
verification prior to the hearing and would have then brought 
this critical matter to the immediate attention of opposing 
counsel and the judge. 
 
 We thereby determine that the District Court erred in 
its assessment of the ―reason for the delay‖ factor.  Contrary 
                                                                                                             
of appearance form, a civil case information statement, a 
concise summary of the case, and a transcript purchase order 
on or before June 25, 2010; and (5) on June 25, 2010, an 
entry of appearance from Rohn as well as a civil case 
information statement, concise summary of the case, 
disclosure statement, and transcript purchase order.  Again, 
we emphasize that the fact that the ECF filings purportedly 
went to Rohn‘s new motions attorney—and were not 
otherwise received or monitored by Rohn herself—weighs 
against any finding of excusable neglect.   
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to the District Court‘s characterization, this factor strongly 
weighs against any finding of excusable neglect.  We, 
however, must still address the District Court‘s assessment of 
the remaining Pioneer factors.  ―Under Pioneer, a court must 
take into account all relevant circumstances surrounding a 
party‘s failure to file, and failing to disprove ‗reasonable 
control‘ is not necessarily fatal to a petitioner‘s request for 
relief.  To state it differently, the ‗control‘ factor does not 
necessarily trump all the other relevant factors.‖  George 
Harms Constr. Co. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Therefore, while prejudice to the opposing party, disruption 
of efficient judicial administration, and bad faith are 
frequently absent, the mere fact that ―those factors may nearly 
always favor‖ the moving party does not mean that they can 
be ignored.  Id. 
 
We nevertheless must conclude that the other Pioneer 
factors, at best, provide only minimal support for the District 
Court‘s ―excusable neglect‖ finding.  Accordingly, they are 
clearly insufficient to outweigh the ―reason for the delay‖ 
factor. 
 
It is well established that, as Ragguette points out, ―a 
finding of prejudice should be a conclusion based on facts in 
evidence.‖  In re O‘Brien Envt‘l Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 
127 (3d Cir. 1999).  In other words, prejudice does not consist 
of ―an imagined or hypothetical harm,‖ and, on the contrary, 
prejudice generally occurs where, for instance, the opposing 
party has lost evidence or placed substantial reliance on the 
judgment or there is an increased potential for fraud or 
collusion.  Id.  The District Court appropriately noted that 
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Premier would have faced the prospect of a trial even if its 
opponent had filed a notice of appeal within the applicable 
30-day period.  ―Nor is there evidence that defendant has 
incurred any significant costs since the entry of judgment, or 
that it will incur significant costs connected to this motion.‖  
Ragguette, 2011 WL 2359920, at *1. The District Court, 
at the very least, ultimately accorded too much weight to this 
particular factor in the current circumstances.  In particular, 
Premier points out that it was certain there would be no 
appeal once the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal had 
expired and no notice of appeal (or Rule 4(a)(5) motion) had 
been either filed or served within this 30-day period.  Viewed 
in isolation, this contention overlooks a number of well-
established mechanisms available to pursue an appeal even in 
absence of an otherwise timely notice of appeal, including 
Rule 4(a)(5) itself.  We, however, are not confronted here 
with the more typical situation of an appellant who, while still 
managing to serve the notice of appeal on the opposing party 
in a timely fashion, failed to file a notice of appeal with the 
district court within the generally applicable 30-day period 
due to some sort of unfortunate oversight.  As we have 
already discussed in some detail, Rohn never indicated to 
opposing counsel or the District Court the possibility of an 
appeal until the Rule 4(a)(5) motion was filed on March 5, 
2010.  In fact, a fee hearing was actually held before the 
District Court only days before the expiration of the 60-day 
period established by Rule 4(a)(5), and, yet again, not a word 
was said about any possible appeal.  Given these 
circumstances, Premier could have been led to believe that its 
adversary did not intend to appeal from the District Court‘s 
order granting its summary judgment motion and that the only 
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remaining issue in the litigation was the subsidiary question 
of fees and costs. 
 
 We reach the same basic conclusion with respect to the 
―length of the delay and its potential impact on the judicial 
proceedings‖ factor.  The length of the delay must be 
examined in ―absolute terms‖ or in an ―absolute sense,‖ 
meaning that the extent of the delay should be considered in 
isolation.  O‘Brien, 188 F.3d at 129-30; see also, e.g., 
Orthopedic Bone Screw, 246 F.3d at 325.  The District Court 
reasonably observed that ―[t]he delay, measured at the time 
Ragguette filed his motion, was twenty-nine days, but within 
the time for filing the Rule 4 motion.‖  Ragguette, 2011 WL 
2359920, at *1.  While it appropriately found that such a 
delay ―was not inordinate,‖ id., this finding must still be 
weighed against the other Pioneer factors.  We also cannot 
overlook the fact that Ragguette filed his motion on Friday, 
March 5, 2010—the 59th day of the 60-day period.  He only 
had one more business day—Monday, March 8, 2010—left to 
seek relief under Rule 4(a)(5).  In other words, this is not a 
case where a party filed the Rule 4(a)(5) motion within the 
original 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal or even 
just a few days after this initial period had expired. 
 
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that neither 
Ragguette nor Rohn appeared to act in bad faith, at least in 
the specific sense of engaging in outright misconduct or 
inequitable behavior.  Nevertheless, we still cannot overlook 
the manifest lack of diligence on the part of Ragguette‘s 
attorney and, in particular, the multiple opportunities she had 
to discover the failure to file a notice of appeal and then to 
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attempt to remedy such a clear and serious mistake.  Most 
significantly, even though Rohn finally discovered what 
happened when preparing for the March 1, 2010 fee hearing, 
she did not even mention this discovery or a possible appeal 
at the hearing itself.  While her intent to obtain verification 
was perhaps understandable, such a justification does not 
really carry much weight here, especially given the clear 
deficiencies with respect to how Rohn and her firm handled 
the filing of a notice of appeal, her lack of due diligence, and 
her status as an experienced litigator.  Even if there was ―no 
reason to believe that [Rohn] ever acted in bad faith,‖ we 
cannot conclude that she was ―so careful or vigilant as to 
overcome the weight‖ of the ―reason for the delay‖ factor.  In 
re Am. Classic Voyages Co., 405 F.3d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 
2005) (determining that bankruptcy court did not abuse 
discretion by finding that failure to file claim by bar date did 
not qualify as excusable neglect and also specifically stating 
that party‘s care and vigilance were not sufficient to 
overcome weight of other factors—especially ―second‖ 
factor). 
 
 In the end, we must conclude that the District Court 
abused its discretion.  While we acknowledge the deferential 
nature of our review, it is clear that the ―reason for the delay‖ 
factor strongly weighs against any finding of excusable 
neglect.  It is also clear that the remaining factors, at best, 
provide only minimal support for such a finding and thereby 
cannot overcome the weight of the ―reason for the delay‖ 
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factor.
5
  In other words, the Court is confronted in this case 
with more than the simple and understandable ―failure to 
proofread a caption‖ at issue in Consolidated.  827 F.2d at 
921.  In fact, counsel—unlike her counterpart in 
Consolidated—never even managed to draft a notice of 
appeal within the applicable 30-day period, and, accordingly, 
there was no ―timely service of the Notice of Appeal upon 
opposing counsel.‖  Id. at 920.  We likewise are not dealing 
here with anything comparable to Pioneer‘s ―unusual form of 
notice.‖  Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 399. 
 
More broadly, we note that a ruling in favor of 
Ragguette in the current circumstances could be read as 
condoning and even rewarding otherwise avoidable 
mistakes—and even outright incompetence—on the part of 
even experienced attorneys.  Far from deterring such 
mistakes, such a signal could lead to yet more claims of 
excusable neglect premised on attorney incompetence in 
connection with the critical—yet relatively simple—step of 
filing a notice of appeal within the applicable time period for 
doing so. 
 
IV. 
 
                                                 
5
 Given this assessment of the Pioneer factors, we need 
not—and do not—decide whether a prior panel of our Court 
was correct to suggest in dicta that the ―danger of prejudice‖ 
factor constitutes ―the most important [factor] of all.‖  Diet 
Drugs, 401 F.3d at 154.   
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 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the 
District Court improvidently granted Ragguette‘s motion for 
an extension of time to file a notice of appeal under Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).  We accordingly will 
dismiss Ragguette‘s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
